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Local Government Fiscal Competition in
Developing Countries: The Case of Indonesia1
Javier Arze del Granado*, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez** and
R. Renata Simatupang** 
This paper explores the role and significance of spatial fiscal competition
among local governments in the developing world. Although there is now
a large literature on local fiscal competition in North America and
Western Europe, little is known about the extent and significance of fiscal
interaction among local governments in the many developing countries
that have undergone fiscal decentralization process over the last decade.
This paper, in particular, examines whether jurisdictional competition (in
the forms of expenditure externalities, tax competition, and yardstick
competition) has been present in Indonesia, a country that was strongly
decentralized starting in 2001. Our empirical results strongly suggest the
relevance of fiscal competition in the case of Indonesia. 
Este artículo explora el papel e importancia del modelo de competencia
fiscal espacial entre gobiernos locales en países en vías de desarrollo. A
pesar de que existe ahora una literatura significativa sobre
competencia fiscal espacial en América del Norte y Europa Occidental,
poco se conoce sobre la relevancia del modelo de competencia fiscal
espacial en países en vías de desarrollo que han experimentado
grandes avances en el proceso de descentralización fiscal durante la
última década. En este articulo, en particular, examinamos la
presencia de  competencia fiscal espacial (en sus formas de
externalidades del gasto, competencia impositiva y competencia de
marca) en Indonesia, un país que ha estado embarcado en un fuerte
proceso de descentralización desde 2001. Nuestros resultados empíricos
* International Monetary Fund 
** International Studies Program and Economics Department, Andrew Young School
of Policy Studies, Georgia State University
1 We are grateful to Yudha Permana and Sukmawah Yuningsih for their support in early
stages of the data collection and to Luis Caramés and María Cadaval for their hos-
pitality and Sonia Paty for comments during the initial workshop in Santiago de Com-
postela where an earlier draft of this paper was presented.
  
sugieren de una forma significativa la relevancia del modelo de
competencia fiscal espacial en Indonesia.  
Key words: Fiscal Competition, Spillover Effects, Yardstick competition,
Tax competition, Spatial Lag Model, Spatial Interaction, Decentralization
in Indonesia
JEL classification: H71, H72, H75, H77, C21
I. Introduction 
This paper explores the role and significance of spatial fiscal competi-
tion among local governments in the developing world. An increasing
number of papers in the fiscal competition literature, as reviewed below,
have established the importance of spatial interaction among local
governments in the United States and several Western European coun-
tries. Although over the last two decades many developing and transi-
tional countries have been involved in deep decentralization reforms,
providing local governments with different degrees of fiscal autonomy,
little is known about the extent and significance of fiscal interaction
among local governments in those countries. 
Fiscal and other forms of spatial interactions among local governments
can help shape important institutional features and outcomes of decen-
tralization. Although the goals of decentralization may not differ that
much between industrialized and developing countries, the forms of decen-
tralization and the institutional and budgetary constraints with which local
governments operate in those two categories of countries may mean that
the role played and the outcomes produced by local fiscal competition may
differ considerably between the developing and developed worlds. 
However, the potential of fiscal competition, in particular some forms
of it such as yardstick competition, can be of much more significance in
the developing world because other forms of voice (such as, elections and
referenda), and exit (such as, household and firm mobility) are likely to work
less effectively in shaping the behavior of local governments in developing
countries than in western democracies. The decentralization theorem
(Oates, 1972) argues that decentralized governance can improve overall
efficiency in public service delivery by bringing greater diversity into the supply
of public services, thus enabling government to better serve heterogeneous
preferences for public goods. Along with this efficiency or preference mat-
ching argument for decentralization, it is also argued (Shah, 1999) that decen-
tralization can facilitate political participation of the citizens and improve
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government’s accountability to citizens. But, whether greater accountabi-
lity is a pre-condition for decentralization to yield efficiency benefits in deve-
loping countries that have decentralized or whether it constitutes an addi-
tional desirable outcome of decentralization in these countries is still open
to debate. There is merit to both views and this is not the place to attempt
to reconcile them.2 But in the context of decentralization in many develo-
ping countries, we would expect that the presence of some forms of com-
petition among jurisdictions will affect local government accountability and
therefore the overall effectiveness of decentralization. 
The literature on spatial fiscal competition has identified at least three
forms of interactions among local governments: expenditure spillovers,
tax competition, and yardstick/benchmark competition. Each of these forms
of jurisdictional competition can have a significant impact - both positi-
ve and negative - on how a decentralized system actually works. Several
empirical conclusions could be drawn from the existing literature (McLu-
re, 1986; Wilson, 1999). First, due to benefit spillover from local expen-
diture, local government may set less spending than would be required for
welfare maximization. This assumes that public spending in one jurisdiction
can substitute for public spending in other jurisdictions, allowing these
other jurisdictions to free ride. However, some of the spillovers may invol-
ve some complementary services; for example, better public amenities and
better highways. The externality effect may also involve imitation beha-
vior. Better parks and amenities in one jurisdiction may induce similar
expenditures in other jurisdictions. Second, competition for mobile tax
bases may result in sub-optimal levels of expenditure; some taxes are kept
too low or resources are employed to finance government programs (cre-
ating incentives to attract mobile capital) that do not benefit production.
However, some forms of tax competition may also lead to less waste or
less Leviathan-type behavior (Brennan and Buchanan, 1977).
The question that particularly interests us is how fiscal competition
may affect accountability. Although tax competition and expenditure spi-
llovers may have effects on accountability, it is yardstick competition that
14
2 However, it is interesting to note that critics of decentralization in developing coun-
tries (Bahl and Linn, 1992, Prud’homme, 1995; Tanzi, 1996) typically have argued
that decentralization may not be able to deliver the benefits it promises because local
governments in these countries lack accountability, or in addition, that they are vul-
nerable to elite capture, have limited technical capacity or human and financial resour-
ces, are too corrupt, and so on.
 
is likely to have the largest impact on accountability. With decentrali-
zation, local governments come to manage larger amounts of budget
resources with no supervision, or limited supervision, from the central
government but residents are expected to become more vocal on how
resources should be managed either because some of the resources come
from local taxes or because other resources (shared revenues and trans-
fers) are to be spent for their benefit. On the other hand, assuming that
local politicians are vote seekers, local government choice of policies will
affect their chance of being re-elected. Even with an imperfect flow of
information, we would expect citizens to have some information on the
performance of local governments in nearby jurisdictions. In particu-
lar, citizens may be able to compare policy decisions by their own govern-
ment with those of neighboring jurisdictions. The incumbent will need
to answer to its constituents if its policy is deemed less favorable com-
pared to that of similar or nearby localities. Hence, one way to gauge the
effectiveness of the accountability mechanism in decentralized develo-
ping countries is by examining the presence or significance of fiscal com-
petition among local jurisdictions. This is the main objective of this paper.
To the best of our knowledge, studies for fiscal competition in deve-
loping countries are non existent. We aim to fill the gap in the litera-
ture by examining whether jurisdictional competition has been present
in Indonesia, a country that was strongly decentralized starting in 2001.
The choice of Indonesia to carry the study reflects not only the fairly
dramatic and well-known effort to transform one the most centralized
countries in the developing world into one of the most decentralized,
but also the facts that Indonesia’s system is representative among deve-
loping countries and that fair amounts of data are available to conduct
the demanding empirical analysis. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section two we explain
briefly the decentralization process in Indonesia and the challenge the
country has faced in moving from highly centralized to highly decen-
tralized regimes. In section three we review the literature on models and
empirical findings for different forms of competition. In section four
we apply the empirical models to Indonesia and discuss our findings.
In the last section we conclude.  
II. Decentralization in Indonesia
After its independence in the post World War II period, Indonesia remai-
ned a highly centralized country for many years under the tight control
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of the Suharto dictatorship. Following the transition to a democratic regi-
me after the fall of the Suharto in the late 1990s, full scale decentraliza-
tion reform started in Indonesia in 2001 with a package of sweeping policy
reforms that became known as the “Big Bang”.3 Almost overnight Indo-
nesia went from being one of the most centralized countries in the world
to being one of the most decentralized, especially on the expenditure side
of the budget. Although the original fears about the potential chaos that
could follow such a rapid decentralization process did not materialize,
the transition was far from smooth. Over the last six years there has been
a continuous process of reform and fine tuning of the initial reforms.
The main feature of the “Big Bang” reform involved a massive dele-
gation of responsibility for the provision of public services. The central
government retained for itself only five basic functions and decentrali-
zed all other expenditure assignments. Specifically, this meant the reas-
signment of two thirds of the central government’s civil servants (over
one and an half million employees) and over 16,000 service delivery faci-
lities to the provincial and municipal government levels, mostly the lat-
ter.4 As a result the share of local and provincial government in total
government expenditure almost doubled (Table 1); in fact, in terms of
expenditures, Indonesia became one of the most decentralized countries
in the world. In East Asia, only China has more decentralized expendi-
tures than Indonesia. 
However, decentralization on the expenditure side was less than com-
plete. An important fact is that, for a variety of reasons including seve-
ral political issues, the central government still pays all the wages and
salaries of public employees at the sub-national level, controlling the num-
ber of official employees and to a large extent salary levels.5 Sub-natio-
nal governments have found ways to get around these constraints by hiring
non-official workers and by paying a variety of bonuses, but neverthe-
less autonomy on the expenditure side is somewhat limited.
16
3 See Alm, Martinez-Vazquez and Mulyani (2004) and Hofman and Kaiser (2004). 
4 Because of fears of political disintegration, most of the expenditure powers went to
the local governments or municipalities as opposed to the provincial or regional govern-
ments. The new decentralized order also called for little or no hierarchical relation
between the provinces and the municipalities.
5 Employee salaries are financed by allocating a portion of the large unconditional grant
program originally designed for equalization purposes and known as the DAU (Dana
Alokasi Umum), to finance wages and salaries. 
 
Table 1. Share of Central, Province and District Government Budgets
Before After
decentralization decentralization
Share 1994 1999 2001 2004
Revenues 100% 100% 100% 100%
Central government 94% 96% 94% 90%
Province 4% 2% 3% 6%
Kabupaten (municipalities) 2% 2% 3% 4%
Expenditures 100% 100% 100% 100%
Routine expenditures 60% 77% 79% 73%
Development expenditures 40% 23% 21% 27%
Central government 69% 80% 74% 66%
Routine expenditures 42% 64% 62% 52%
Development expenditures 27% 16% 12% 14%
Province 15% 6% 6% 7%
Routine expenditures 10% 3% 3% 3%
Development expenditures 5% 3% 3% 4%
Kabupaten 16% 14% 20% 27%
Routine expenditures 8% 9% 14% 18%
Development expenditures 8% 5% 6% 9%
Balance as % of National Exp. 100% 100% 100% 100%
Central government 36% 23% 11% 24%
Province -10% -4% -3% -1%
Kabupaten -14% -12% -18% -22%
Source: Public Expenditure Review Indonesia 2007 (World Bank)
On the revenue side, the decentralization process was much less
ambitious. Sub-national governments were given little autonomy in the
sense that all major tax sources were kept by the central authorities, inclu-
ding the property tax, and revenue sharing and transfers constitute the
most important finance sources for sub-national governments.6 In par-
ticular, sub-national governments depend largely on the unconditional
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6 Initially, sub-national governments were given authority to introduce their own taxes
provided they did not overlap with existing central government taxes. This open list
approach to local taxes gave rise to many awkward and inefficient tax forms even
though the new taxes were supposed to be approved by the central authorities.
Eventually, these sub-national powers were significantly curtailed.
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equalization grant or DAU, a large portion of which goes to finance wages,
and less so from the conditional grant of DAK (Dana Alokasi Khusus).
The extensive role played by revenue sharing and transfers provides
incentives for regional governments not to use their own sources of reve-
nue but instead to ask for more transfer/revenue sharing as financing
needs increase. 
Table 2. Provincial and Municipal Government Revenue (in Trillion
Rupiah)
Before After
decentralization decentralization
1994 1999 2001 2004
Provincial Government Revenues
Own source revenue 2,977 4,364 10,005 22,696 
Balancing funds (salaries) 6,000 7,324 14,447 19,823
Shared taxes 475 1,277 4,348 8,759 
Shared natural resources revenue 275 896 3,366 2,833 
Autonomous region subsidy (SDO) 4,003 2,218 - -
Presidential grants (INPRES) 1,246 2,933 - -
DAU (Unconditional grants) - - 6,575 8,217
DAK (Conditional grants) - - 158 13
Other revenue 28 5 1,033 3,482
Total Revenue (excl. balancing funds) 9,004 11,693 25,485 46,000
Municipal Government Revenues
Own source revenue 1,219 2,791 5,267 10,131
Balancing funds (salaries) 8,388 24,082 70,609 101,935
Shared taxes 1,349 2,874 5,849 13,706 
Shared natural resources revenue 176 534 8,575 8,773
Autonomous region subsidy (SDO) 3,372 14,118 - -  
Presidential grants (INPRES) 3,490 6,555 - -  
DAU (Unconditional grants) -   - 55,301 75,794
DAK (Conditional grants) - - 885 3,661
Other revenue 61 280 2,822 10,055
Total Revenue (excl. balancing funds) 9,667 27,152 78,699 122,120
Source: Public Expenditure Review Indonesia 2007 (World Bank)
In summary, the current decentralization system In Indonesia is
fairly typical of decentralized systems in other developing countries, which
18
are characterized by the following: (i) considerable decentralization on
the expenditure side of the budget in terms of the competences to be imple-
mented and the autonomy to make expenditure decisions, with the
important exception of employment and compensation issues for civil
servants; (ii) limited revenue autonomy in terms of own taxes with dis-
cretion to change rates and collect significant levels of revenues and heavy
revenue dependence on revenue sharing and other forms of transfers.
Politically, Indonesia is also fairly decentralized with all legislative coun-
cils and executive bodies being democratically elected. However, admi-
nistrative decentralization is limited to the extent that the central
government still pays for the salaries of local civil servants and controls
the hiring and firing. Sub-national governments get around these con-
trols by hiring non-permanent employees and paying salary bonuses. The
extent and forms of political and administrative decentralization in
Indonesia is also fairly representative of that in other decentralized
developing countries. 
III. Literature Review
The behavior of decentralized government units at different levels can
lead to various forms of externalities or inter-jurisdictional effects.
Depending on what levels of government are involved, externalities are
typically classified as horizontal externalities when spillover effects are
at the same tier of government, and vertical externalities, when the spi-
llover effects involve different tiers of government. Our interest here is
exclusively on horizontal fiscal externalities.
As Boadway (2001) emphasizes, horizontal fiscal externalities can be
positive or negative; that is, they can provide an incentive for sub-natio-
nal governments at the same level to set too high or too low a level of
taxes and/or expenditures. These externality interactions generally recei-
ve the name in the literature of jurisdiction fiscal competition. To dis-
tinguish between the different types of government interaction and
navigate the body of literature that has explored each of these interac-
tion types, in this section and the next we will follow closely to the cate-
gorization and model specifications used by Brueckner (2003) and Reve-
lli (2006).
Expenditure spillover effects
This form of competition exists when a decision made by a government
(typically assumed to be local welfare maximizing) affects the preferences
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of another government (Gordon, 1983).  Each jurisdiction i chooses the
level of its decision variable (gi), but its welfare (apart from private con-
sumption ci and a vector of own characteristics Xi) also affected both
by its own expenditure for local public services (gi) and on spending in
a nearby jurisdiction n(gn):
ui = u[ci(yi, gi, li), gi, gn, Xi]
where private consumption ci depends on income (yi), level of public
spending (gi) and grants from central government (li). Depending on
the type of spillover, (δui/δgn) could be positive for complementary public
services or negative for substitutive services.
The welfare maximizing solution for the optimal level of public ser-
vice in jurisdiction i then also depends on the neighbor’s expenditure
gn:
gi = g[gn, yi, li, Xi]
Or as expressed in linear specification:
gi = θ1 + θ2 gn + θ3 yi + θ4 li + Xi κ + ζi [1]
where ζi is a random term, κ is a vector of parameters, θ3 is the response
of local spending to income and θ4 is the response of local spending to
grants from central government. The parameter of interest is θ2 which
captures the relationship between local public expenditure decision and
jurisdiction n’s choice of expenditure.
The literature on expenditure spillovers is fairly rich in empirical evi-
dence, especially for the United States and European countries. Empi-
rical results show that some types of public services, such as public
infrastructure, education, training and environmental services tend to
have spillover effect to neighboring jurisdictions.  
One of the earliest studies in fiscal interaction that incorporates
spatial econometrics methods is by Case, Rosen and Hines (1993). They
find that a state’s expenditures in the United States on roads, education
and welfare are positively affected by the expenditure levels of its neigh-
bors. Cohen and Paul (2003) and Pereira and Andraz (2004) draw simi-
lars conclusion while Kelejian and Robinson (1997) and Boarnet (1998)
found no evidence of quantitatively important productivity spillover
20
from state highway expenditure. However, Cohen and Paul (2004)
found that airport expansion in one state has considerable impact for
other states, and Murdoch, Rahmatian and Thayer (1993) conclude that
the benefit from recreation expenditures by local governments in Cali-
fornia is also enjoyed by non residents. For European cases, Sole-Olle
(2006) found benefit spillovers arising from municipal expenditure on
suburban public goods in Spain. Hanes (2002) found that Swedish
municipalities free ride to benefit from neighbors’ rescue expenditure,
while Revelli (2003) studied the spillover impacts of English districts’
environmental and cultural services expenditures. On the other hand,
research on this issue for developing countries is very limited. Ferreira
(2002), finds that under-provision of public health services in the Rio
de Janeiro metropolitan area (Brazil) is due to the failure to internali-
ze the expenditure spillover benefits generated by city of Rio to its
surrounding cities.
Another strand of literature involving expenditure spillover effects
is the welfare competition model7 . In order to avoid being a welfare mag-
net, jurisdictions are likely to set their welfare benefits to be less attrac-
tive compared to their neighbors’. Although there is no significant evi-
dence of welfare-seeking population migration in the Unite States
(Walker 1994; Levine and Zimmerman 1995), it is observed that a sta-
te’s responses to its neighbor’s decrease in welfare is significantly lar-
ger in magnitude than its response to its neighbor’s increase in welfare
(Figlio et al 1999). There is additional evidence of strategic behavior among
states regarding welfare expenditures in the United States (Saavedra
2000; Baicker 2005) and in Norway (Fiva and Rattso, 2006).
Tax competition
This form of fiscal competition focuses on how the tax policy of a par-
ticular jurisdiction i influences the size of ‘resources’ available for the
neighboring jurisdiction (Brueckner 2003). As a result, jurisdiction i’s
policy affects indirectly the fiscal policy of its neighbors, thus creating
competition for mobile resources (Wilson 1999).
Due to indirect interaction with a neighboring jurisdiction’s choice
of fiscal policy, the tax base (or resources) in one jurisdiction i(bi) is a
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7 Some of the literature (for example, Brueckner, 2000 and  Revelli 2006) place the
welfare competition model under the tax competition framework, and treat welfa-
re seekers as a (negative) mobile resource. 
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function of its own vector of jurisdiction characteristic Yi; own policy
i(ti) as well as jurisdiction n’s policy n(tn):
bi = b[ti, tn, Yi]
We could expect that (δbi /δti) < 0 and (δbi /δtn) > 0; a tax increa-
se in jurisdiction i will make that jurisdiction less attractive to mobile
resources since it will depress the capital’s net return. Welfare of juris-
diction i depends on its vector of characteristics (such as demographic
variables) Xi as well as residents’ private consumptions ci and the local
public goods available gi. It is assumed that both consumption and
public goods depend on the size of resources bi available locally:
ui = u[ci(bi), gi(bi), Xi]
By maximizing local welfare subject to the size of resource base, the
solution for optimal tax policy in jurisdiction i is a function of its own
characteristics (Xi, Yi), as well as jurisdiction n’s tax policy:
ti = t[tn, Xi, Yi]
which is usually written in linear function as:
ti = ρ1 + ρ2 tn + β Xi + δ Yi+ εi [2]
where β and δ are the parameter vectors and εi is a random term. The
variable of interest is ρ2 which shows the responsiveness of jurisdiction
i fiscal policy to its neighbor’s policy. If tax competitions among juris-
dictions exist, we would expect ρ2 ≠ 0. 
The empirical literature shows the existence of horizontal tax com-
petition among jurisdictions at the same level (Ladd 1992; Brett and Pink-
se 2000; Brueckner and Saavedra 2001; Feld and Reulier 2005).8 The results
from studies on competition for mobile resources (including Tiebout-
22
8 Other studies have also explored the presence of vertical tax competition among dif-
ferent levels of government  (Besley and Rosen 1998; Goodspeed 2000; Hayashi and
Boadway 2001; Esteller-More and Sole-Olle 2002) while a particular section of lite-
rature deals with regional or international tax competitions (Devereux, Lockwood
et al. 2002; Zodrow 2003; Wilson and Janeba 2005).
like competition for residential location of mobile taxpayers) show that
the location choice of mobile resources (enterprises, voters or taxpayers)
is tied to how fiscal policies of a jurisdiction compares to its neighbors.
Brett and Pinkse (2000) examined the competition for tax bases in Bri-
tish Columbia; Buettner (2001) observed the significant competition
among local jurisdictions in Germany for business taxes; while Feld
and Kirchgassner (2003) found that canton’s corporate and income tax
rates affect corporate location choice in Swiss. The literature also sug-
gests that competition for business may ignite “fiscal wars” where juris-
dictions reduced their taxes in order to attract new business. Ferreira et
al (2005) report that states in Brazil reduced value added taxes to attract
new investment, although the practice has been unlawful since 1975.
Otherwise, there seems to be limited evidence on the existence of a ‘race
to the bottom” in inter-jurisdiction tax competition. 
Yardstick competition
Yardstick competition is based upon the existence of informational
externalities among neighboring jurisdictions; in the general setting,
imperfectly informed voters in a jurisdiction use information on govern-
ment performance in nearby jurisdictions as a yardstick or benchmark
to evaluate their own government (Besley and Case, 1995). Standards
of performance can take different forms and can include taxes; for
example, voters can look at the neighbor’s tax policies as a proxy for the
cost of public services. As a result of this information spillover, public
officials in any one jurisdiction will try to keep up with the policies of
nearby jurisdictions.
The literature on yardstick competition presents two main sets of empi-
rical results. First, neighboring jurisdictions tend to mimic each other’s
tax policy. Ladd (1992) finds evidence of tax mimicking among coun-
ties in the United States, while Besley and Case (1995) and Rork (2003)
find similar behavior across states also in the United States. The empi-
rical literature also finds evidence of tax mimicking in European coun-
tries. Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998) find tax mimicking behavior among
municipalities in Belgium; Revelli (2002) for local property tax in
England; Sole-Olle (2003) for Spanish municipalities; Feld and Reulier
(2005) for Swiss cantons; Allers and Elhorst (2005) for municipalities
in Netherland. 
Second, evidence from yardstick competition suggests that both
own tax rates and neighboring tax rates may affect electoral outco-
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mes. Besley and Case (1995) find that in the presence of asymmetric
information concerning the cost of  providing public services, voters
can use the information on tax policy in neighboring jurisdictions
to decide whether or not to re-elect the incumbent politicians. Reve-
lli (2002b) draws similar conclusions from observing that an English
municipality’s own property tax increase haves a negative impact on
incumbent’s popularity while a neighbors’ tax increases have a posi-
tive impact. Vermeir and Heyndels (2006) also report similar con-
clusions for the Flemish municipalities of Belgium, Bosch and Sole-
Olle (2007) for municipalities in Spain, and Bordignon et al. (2003)
observe similar behavior for  municipalities in Italy when mayors are
running for re-election. 
IV. Empirical Model and Estimation Results
General approach 
Our goal is to examine the presence of fiscal competition in Indonesia
using budgetary data for local governments for 2004 or three years after
the big decentralization effort. Besides budget data, we also use the
results from Governance and Decentralization Survey (GDS 2) in 2004
and other socio-demographic variables and indicators from the Bureau
of Statistics in Indonesia. 
Our empirical approach is to test for the presence of all three forms
of fiscal competition identified in the review of the literature: expen-
diture spillover effects, tax competition and yardstick competition.
However, our ability to carry out these tests is somewhat limited by
several institutional restrictions and issues of data availability. These issues
are discussed below for each of the estimations.   
Econometric Modeling and Definition of the Weighting Matrix
At the core of the empirical relationship for fiscal competition lies the
concept of spatial autocorrelation: the existence of a systematic pattern
on the spatial distribution of a variable of interest that occurs when the
units of observation are distributed geographically in a given space
(Cliff and Ord, 1981). In these cases standard OLS estimation is usually
miss-specified due to spatial dependence among observations which
can take the form of a spatial autoregressive process on the error term
(spatial error model) or, if a spatially lagged dependent variable is inclu-
ded as a regressor, the spatial dependence takes the form of a mixed regres-
24
sive spatial autoregressive process corresponding to the following spa-
tial regression model:   
Y = ρWY + Xβ + µ
where ρ denotes the autoregressive parameter, W a weight matrix, β is the
(k x 1) vector of regressive parameters, X the (k x 1) vector of explana-
tory variables, and µ is a spatial white noise field such that u ≈ N(0; σ2In).
This is referred as a spatial lag model.9
Estimating the parameters of the spatial weighting matrix would be desi-
rable, but this approach is unfortunately unfeasible. An alternative way to
address this issue is to define a parametric representation of the covariance
structure of W following assumptions made on the spatial auto-correlation
of the observations. Different approaches have been followed in the litera-
ture, among others, the inverse distance (Anselin 1988), income and ethnic
composition (Case et al, 1993), the structure of a social network (Doreian,
1980), or a fixed amount of nearest neighbors (Pinkse and Slade, 1998). 
For Indonesia we use two alternative types of neighboring definitions.
The first is based on geographic distance and the second is based on inter-
jurisdictional migration patterns. If we denote di,j as the distance bet-
ween the centroid of the local districts i and j, the distance-weighting
matrix can be defined as wi,j = 1/dij for all districts j that have their cen-
troid within a radius of 150 km from district’s i’s centroid. See Figure 1.
The weighting matrix W is row standardized so that
which ensures that the neighbors’ influences on each district are the same
regardless of their number.
It can be argued that a district’s direct geographic neighbors may not
necessarily be the benchmarks of inter-jurisdictional competition. Local
districts may imitate, or compete with jurisdictions that are higher in the
hierarchical structure of the country such as competition with the nea-
rest provincial capital or districts with larger economic activity. Neigh-
boring hierarchical structure in this sense could be proxied by similarity
in gross domestic product (Case et al, 1993). While defining neighboring
districts by income level has its virtues, it also has the drawback that it
fails to capture the geographic dimension, as the distributions of districts
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9 Arbia (2006) provides a full derivation of the log likelihood function for this model.
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with comparable levels of income per capita over a country’s area are unco-
rrelated to geographic proximity.  Preserving to some degree the geo-
graphic dimension of the weights is desirable as geographic derived
weights are clearly exogenous to the model, and thus less likely to gene-
rate identification problems. Migration patterns are arguably able to
capture the hierarchical structure as economically thriving districts
attract migrants from districts with lower ranges of services available and
with lower employment opportunities, while it is likely inversely corre-
lated to the distance between any two districts. Therefore, we explore a
second weighting approach by defining mi,j as the share of population
born in district i residing in district j in total population born in i resi-
ding out of it. Migration flows are asymmetric, and so, (wi,j = wj,i) is
defined so that it contains the largest of the two shares.10 In order to deter-
mine the cut-off point (the criteria defining a limit above which inte-
ractions are assumed negligible) we rank (by row) the flows of migra-
tion for each district and define the top ten destinations for each district
as its neighbors.
Testing for Expenditure Spillover Effects 
In order to identify the presence of expenditure spillovers it is necessary to
assume that sub-national governments have discretion on how to spend
their resources. This is an assumption that is not always met in developing
decentralized countries. In the case of Indonesia, despite devolution of public
spending in 2001, the intergovernmental structure in Indonesia determi-
nes that de facto local districts have limited autonomy over the use of some
of their public resources. As we already mentioned, a large portion of the
general allocation transfer (DAU) is aimed at covering the full amount of
the district’s civil service wage bill, while the central government has retai-
ned the authority to manage the sub-national civil service. 
Therefore, for Indonesia, the current structure determines that expendi-
tures on salaries for civil service are non-discretionary for district governments
and thus not subject to strategic competitive behavior. In practice, district
governments have circumvented this by hiring contractual employees to
cover additional needs in different sectors. Unfortunately the current bud-
26
10 This assumption may be questioned; for example, while a capital city may absorb a
significant share of a smaller neighbor migrant population, the inverse would often
be close to zero. Alternative ways of weighting both shares were considered but the
results seem to undermine the degree of correlation between observations. 
 
get classification does not allow for the separation of those expenditures from
civil servants’ salaries. In order to test the predictions of the expenditure spi-
llover model, we separate discretionary from non-discretionary expenditu-
res at the sub-national level by defining non-discretionary expenditures as:
capital expenditures plus non-personnel routine expenditures (goods and mate-
rials, operations and maintenance, other routine expenditures, others). 
Since the benefits of public services in one jurisdiction may spill
over in neighboring jurisdictions, we theorize that district’s i’s per capi-
ta expenditures (yi) depend on its own characteristics - a (k x 1) vector
Xi of explanatory variables, and also on the expenditures of its neigh-
bor districts yj (with j ≠ i). The nature of this interaction is examined
by introducing a spatial lag operator, which is essentially a weighted ave-
rage of the dependent variable of neighboring districts. The reaction func-
tion for spending category k = 1, ..., K of district i can be written as follows: 
[4]
where ρ and α are parameters to be estimated and ui,t is a random error,
and wi,j are weights defined according to pre-defined alternatives of neigh-
borliness discussed in the previous section. For each row i in the weight
matrix (a district) columns j ≠ i with non-zero values denote neighbo-
ring districts as specified by the two types of criteria (distance and
migration), and wi,i is set to zero by convention.
11
The vector of covariate includes population density, transfers from
central government, state income per capita (excluding oil and gas), pro-
portion of population in school age, proportion of population above 65
years, and a set of geographic variables. The geographic variables inclu-
ded are of particular interest in this model as Indonesia is a country for-
med by 13,000 islands of which six are of considerably larger size.  Thus
the geography of Indonesia is fundamentally different from that of pre-
vious studies in the United States or Europe. Considering this geograp-
hical set up, it is particularly interesting to test several dimensions of
geographic connectivity. We introduce variables to examine the speci-
fic characteristics of geographically isolated island-districts, and districts
without a coast, and also by differences among the main islands (rela-
tive to Java). Figure 1 presents Indonesia’s map and outlines districts that
have some of the geographic characteristics aforementioned.  
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11 See Anselin (1988) for further discussion on spatial weights.
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Figure 1. Neighboring districts within 150 km ring
The estimation results shown in Table 3 present the estimates of dis-
tricts’ log public expenditure per capita (total and sectoral expenditu-
re) as a function of its own characteristics and neighbor’s expenditure,
using the distance weight matrix.
The coefficient of the spatially lagged variable for total expenditures is
positive and significant at the 10% confidence level, suggesting the exis-
tence of a positive spatial interdependence in total discretionary expendi-
tures. However, the relation appears to be relatively inelastic (0<ε<1) as
1% point increase in total discretionary expenditures of neighboring dis-
tricts increases a given district’s own expenditures by 0.07%. Among the
analogous coefficients at the sectoral level only that of expenditures on dis-
cretionary government administration is significant and positive.12 This
is of particular interest as expenditures in the government sector account
for the largest share in sub-national expenditures in Indonesia. The esti-
mated spatial elasticity for sub-national administrative services is almost
twice as large as that of discretionary total expenditures. Some sort of an
imitation effect, and not necessarily of the good kind, would appear to go
on among Indonesia’s local districts. Spending by neighboring districts on
local buildings, cars and so on leads to imitation by other districts. 
The remaining coeficients for spatially lagged sectoral expenditures
have a negative sign but are not statistically significant. Transfers per
28
12 The lack of statistical significance of the coefficients for the remaining sectors is
not surprising as many of the studies conducted in other countries have also failed
to find a spatial interdependence on expenditure estimations based on distance weight
matrices (e.g., Case et al, 1993).
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Table 3. Total and sectoral expenditure spillover with distance 
weight matrix
Total Exp Agriculture Industry
Neighbor’s (sector) log exp/capita 0.0701+ -0.1092 -0.1068
(1.73) (-1.08) (-0.93)
Log GDRP/ capita 0.0019 0.0140 0.2152
(0.14) (0.09) (0.86)
Population density 2.6e-5* -1.98e-4+ -2.57e-4
(2.72) (-1.92) (-1.54)
Log transfer per capita 1.2213** 1.5879** 1.2137+
(34.20) (4.05) (1.92)
%  population in school age 0.7635 7.2036 2.9300
(1.19) (1.02) (0.26)
%  population over 65 -4.6374** 8.5419 -13.3065
(-4.09) (0.69) (-0.66)
Landlocked -0.0746* 0.0268 0.9670
(-2.01) (0.07) (1.46)
Isolated Island 0.0975 -2.8254** -2.0625
(1.20) (-3.29) (-1.49)
Ethic Fractionalization 0.0531 0.0593 0.6749
(0.84) (0.09) (0.60)
Dummy Sumatra -0.3322** -0.4994 -1.4550 -1
(-4.84) (-0.69) (-1.26)
Dummy Kalimantan -0.2182** 0.2923 -1.0751
(-2.65) (0.34) (-0.77)
Dummy Sulawesi -0.2645** -1.2316+ -1.4365 -1
(-3.98) (-1.72) (-1.25)
Dummy Nusa Tenggara & Maluku -0.2342** -0.3450 0.1210 -1
(-2.90) (-0.40) (0.09)
Dummy Papua -0.6169* -0.9618 -0.1631 -1
(-2.50) (-0.44) (-0.05)
Constant -4.4430 -13.1885 -8.6853 -1
(-6.78) (-2.29) (-0.94)
Obs. 266 267 267
Note: z statistic in parentheses, + significant at 10%, *significant at 5%,**significant at 1%
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-0.0793 -0.0269 -0.1217 -0.1021 0.1329*
(-0.77) (-0.25) (-1.17) (-1.00) (2.28)
0.1429 0.0030 0.0937 0.0951 -0.0107
(0.83) (0.17) (0.60) (0.59) (-0.61)
-4.18e-5 1.53e-4 -5.48e-5 -6.85e-5 5.25e-5**
(-0.37) (0.83) (-0.52) (-0.64) (4.32)
1.6631** 1.6631** 1.6588** 1.6979** 1.1129**
(3.85) (3.85) (4.18) (4.19) (24.35)
2.0215 2.0215 5.8740 8.7376 -1.1419
(0.26) (0.26) (0.82) (1.20) (-1.42)
-4.7749 -4.7749 4.7333 6.4257 -6.9109**
(-0.35) (-0.35) (0.38) (0.50) (-4.86)
0.4767** 0.4767** 0.2986 .4082 -0.0769+
(1.05) (1.05) (1.08) (0.96) (-1.66)
-2.0566* -2.0566* -3.0246** -2.9785** 0.1121
(-2.17) (-2.17) (-3.47) (-3.34) (1.15)
-0.2489 -0.2489 -0.3536 -0.3547 0.1142
(-0.32) (-0.32) (-0.50) (-0.49) (1.44)
-1.0031 1.4647 -1.3347+ -0.8585 -0.3156**
(-1.27) (1.11) (-1.84) (-1.15) (-3.66)
-0.4138 -1.3471 -0.7811 -0.50411 -0.2663**
(-0.43) (-0. 86) (-0.90) (-0.57) (-2.60)
-1.4190+ 0.5041 -1.8637** -1.5964* -0.1074
(-1.80) (0.38) (-2.57) (-2.16) (-1.25)
-1.4327 1.9725 -0.9755 -0.5527 -0.1919+
(-1.49) (1.24) (-1.11) (-0.62) (-1.88)
-1.1191 1.2934 -1.4976 -1.6729 -0.4640
(-0.46) (0.33) (-0.68) (-0.74) (-1.59)
-10.7683 -13.6031 -12.3620 13.9318 -3.9773
(-1.68) (-1.27) (-2.10) -   (-2.33) (-4.67)
267 267 267 267 267
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Table 4. Total and sectoral expenditure spillover with migration 
weight matrix
Total Exp Agriculture Industry
Neighbor’s (sector) log exp/capita 0.0499 -0.1092 -0.1769
(0.93) (-0.56) (-0.94)
Log GDRP/ capita -0.0022 -0.0293 0.1993
(-0.16) (-0.18) (0.75)
Population density 2.24e-5* -2.26e-4* -2.75e-4
(2.45) (-2.05) (-1.55)
Log transfer per capita 1.2284** 1.5064** 0.5756 1
(37.83) (3.82) (0.91)
% population in school age 0.4021 3.1901 2.3795 -1
(0.65) (0.43) (0.20)
% population over 65 -5.7932** 4.8945 -8.7146 -1
(-5.23) (0.38) (-0.42)
Landlocked -0.0752* 0.0959 1.3298+
(-2.05) (0.22) (1.46)
Isolated Island 0.0445 -2.8614** -2.6079*
(0.70) (-3.71) (-2.09)
Ethic Fractionalization 0.0491 0.1847 1.0900
(0.79) (0.25) (0.90)
Dummy Sumatra -0.2987** -0.4677 -1.2048
(-4.68) (-0.63) (-1.01)
Dummy Kalimantan -0.2023** 0.2212 -1.0528
(-2.65) (0.24) (-0.72)
Dummy Sulawesi -0.2516** -0.9432 -0.5554 -1
(-3.70) (-1.27) (-0.47)
Dummy Nusa Tenggara & Maluku -0.2257** 0.2665 0.3586
(-2.82) (0.30) (0.25)
Dummy Papua -0.4163** -3.1195* -0.6909
(-3.07) (-1.96) (-0.27)
Constant -4.1267 -10.7748 -0.3665
(-4.95) (-1.76) (-0.04)
Obs. 279 279 279 2
Note: z statistic in parentheses, + significant at 10%, *significant at 5%,**significant at 1%
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-0.1013 0.0472 -0.1739 -0.0913 0.0426
(-0.51) (0.26) (-0.88) (-0.61) (0.72)
0.1179 0.0901 0.0223 0.0743 -0.0143
(0.65) (0.32) (0.13) (0.43) (-0.82)
-7.45e-5 1.29e-4 -7.05e-5 -9.96e-5 4.48e-5**
(-0.62) (0.70) (-0.59) (-0.87) (3.84)
1.6166** 1.8059** 1.2929** 1.5757** 1.1521**
(3.75) (2.71) (3.04) (3.87) (27.47)
-1.9781 -9.2091 2.8912 3.8869 -1.4161+
(-0.24) (-0.73) (0.36) (0.50) (-1.77)
-10.0736 -0.9927 4.7305 2.6037 -7.9090**
(-0.71) (-0.05) (0.34) (0.19) (-5.68)
0.4352 -1.4661+ 0.4422 0.4585 -0.0662
(0.89) (-1.95) (0.92) (0.99) (-1.40)
-2.7023** -4.3479** -4.2064** -3.021** 0.1593+
(-3.20) (-3.35) (-5.04) (-3.79) (1.96)
-0.1491 0.7804 -0.0892 -0.1183 0.1333+
(-0.18) (0.62) (-0.11) (-0.15) (1.68)
-0.9469 1.2694 -0.9647 -0.8124 -0.3002**
(-1.17) (1.01) (-1.21) (-1.06) (-3.64)
-0.6347 -0.4495 -1.1814 -0.4351 -0.2267*
(-0.65) (-0. 30) (-1.22) (-0.47) (-2.24)
-1.2601 0.7920 -1.2495 -1.1944 -0.1152
(-1.56) (0.63) (-1.56) (-1.56) (-1.30)
-0.7009 2.0928 0.0628 -0.0637 -0.1693
(-0.72) (1.38) (0.07) (-0.07) (-1.63)
-3.6292* -1.1593 -2.8238+ -3.3722* -0.0975
(-2.09) (-0.43) (-1.65) (-2.05) (-0.57)
-8.4279 -14.6098 -6.3759 -10.9530 -3.3278
(-1.26) (-1.48) (-0.95) (-1.77) (-3.82)
279 279 279 279 279
capita are statistically significant and positive, with elasticity coeffici-
nets larger than one, a result that confirms the presence of the “fly paper”
effect in Indonesia. The dummy variable for isolated island is negative
and significant in several sectors including agriculture, infrastructure,
housing, health, and education. The dummies used to control for dif-
ferences among the main six islands relative to Jawa are all significant
and negative for overall expenditures, with Papua and Sumatra having
the largest coefficents.
Table 4 presents the results based on the migration-weight matrix.
Note that none of the spatially lagged variables are significant in this
model, while the remaining control variables show similar results as in
the previous model. 
Testing for Yardstick Competition
To test for the presence of yardstick competition we have no voting data.
Instead we test the political economy of tax-setting and voters’ choices
by an approximation to “incumbent’s popularity”. As discussed in the
review of the review of the literature, in the presence of yardstick com-
petition, it would be expected that, other rthings equal, an incumbent
mayor’s popularity will be negatively correlated to the taxes (tax rates)
levied in its own district and positively correlated with the tax rates in
neighbroing districts. Hence, the mayors would face a trade-off betwe-
en higher revenues through higher tax rates, on the one hand, and a lower
opportunity of re-election on the other. Another form of yardstick com-
petition would consist of making the “incumbent’s popularity” depen-
dent on the quality of public services in his own jurisdiction vis-à-vis
the quality of those services in neighboring jurisdictions. 
Lacking voting data, we construct sector-specific satisfaction indicators
from data from the World Bank’s Governance and Decentralization
Survey (GDS 2), covering a sample of 137 districts13. Figure 2 presents
a map with the districts covered by this survey. 
In the survey, respondents were asked to express their satisfaction about
government services. In general, they were asked whether they are satis-
fied, quite satisfied, quite unsatisfied or not satisfied at all about the qua-
lity of health, education and local administrative services. If the indi-
vidual surveyed answers: “satisfied” or “quite satisfied”, we assumed that 
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13 A previous version of this survey is available online. The version used herein will beco-
me available in next few months.
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Figure 2. Coverage of Governance and Decentralization Survey 2004
the individual would have voted “yes” for the incumbent government
if an election had taken place at the time of the survey. If the individual
responded “quite unsatisfied”, or “not satisfied” then we assume the indi-
vidual would have voted “no” for the incumbent mayor. Thus, by using
the survey’s data we are assuming that an incumbent’s popularity can
be proxied by resident voters’ satisfaction with the quality of public ser-
vices but it will aso be affected by how resident voters of neighboring
jurisdictions felt about the quality of the services in their jursidictions.
In order to test these hypotheses regarding the level of satisfaction with
local services and the level of taxes, we estimate a model with the follo-
wing empirical specification:
[5]
where Y ki is defined as the percentage of respondents that scored “satis-
fied” or “quite satisfied” with service dimension k (1 = education; 2 =
health, 3 = administrative), ti are a proxy for tax rates in district i (own
revenues over total revenues), and ρ, φ1, φ2, and α are parameters to be
estimated. The parameter ρ denotes the spatial autoregressive parame-
ter aimed to reveal whether the satisfaction or approval level in juris-
diction i is interdependent with that of its neighbors. Note that as for
district i , since data for other district tax rates are not available, we use
several proxies to capture tax rate: own source revenue as percentage of
GRDP; own source revenue per capita; and own source revenue as per-
centage of total revenues. Table 5 presents the results of this model of
yardstick competition for health, education and administrative services,
34
respectively using the distance weight matrix. Table 6 reproduces the results
with the migration weight matrix. 
Table 5. Satisfaction of government services with distance weight
matrix 
Health Education Administrative 
Services
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Neighboring 0.3659 0.2029 0.6089** 0.2998 0.4461+ 0.2506
districts’ (1.40) (0.75) (3.15) (1.15) (1.74) (0.85)
satisfaction 
Tax rate (own 0.1932 0.0296 -0.1278 -0.2099 0.0323 -0.3463+
source rev./ total (1.58) (0.25) (-0.78) (-1.29) (0.16) (1.71)
revenue)
Neighbor’s tax 0.0370 0.0831* 0.3012** 0.0417 -0.0518 0.0657
rate (0.74) (2.85) (4.75) (1.06) (-0.66) (1.39)
GDRP/capita 0.0036 0.0079 0.0094 0.0186* 0.0133 0.0249*
(0.55) (1.24) (1.06) (2.13) (1.28) (2.32)
Unemployment -0.0381 0.0056 0.2973+ 0.1898 -0.2853 -0.3098
(-0.31) (0.05) (1.83) (1.26) (-1.49) (-1.66)+
ELF -0.0389 -0.0189 -0.0412* -0.0343 -0.0429+ -0.0101
(-2.38)* (-1.18) (-1.98) (-1.58) (-1.69) (-0.37)
Dummy -0.0205 -0.0452 -0.0611*
Sumatra (-1.23) (-1.82) (-2.17)
Dummy -0.0598** -0.0901** -0.0855**
Kalimantan (-3.28) (-3.65) (-2.84)
Dummy 0.0017 0.0198 -0.0483
Sulawesi (0.10) (0.84) (-1.60)
Dummy Nusa -0.0489** -0.0094 -0.0474+
Tenggara & Maluku (-2.59) (-0.42) (-1.66)
Dummy 0.0159 -0.3059** 0.0861
Papua (0.27) (-3.98) (0.89)
Constant 0.5424 0.6585 0.0038 0.5830 0.5489 0.6324
(2.34) (2.66) (0.02) (2.54) (2.55) (2.53)
Obs. 96 99 96 99 96 99
Note: z statistic in parentheses, + significant at 10%, *significant at 5%,**significant at 1%
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Table 6. Satisfaction of government services with migration weight
matrix
Health Education Administrative 
Services
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Neighboring 0.1762 0.0258 0.4357* 0.2773 0.4377** 0.3561*
district’s (0.99) (0.15) (2.45) (1.58) (2.84) (2.18)
satisfaction 
Tax rate (own -1.5569 -1.5116 -3.1027 -4.1984* -3.2286 -3.3064
source rev./total (-1.01) (1.09) (-1.34) (-2.28) (-1.40) (-1.48)
revenue)
Neighbor’s tax 1.6581 1.4893 3.0535 3.7967* 3.1319 2.9574
rate (1.13) (1.13) (1.39) (2.17) (1.43) (1.40)
GDRP/capita 0.0044 0.0083 0.0006 0.0158+ 0.0109 0.0188+
(0.65) (1.28) (0.06) (1.79) (1.04) (1.77)
Unemployment -0.0294 0.0248 0.1164 0.1494 -0.3641+ -0.3977
(-0.22) (0.21) (0.58) (0.90) (-1.81) (-1.99)*
Ethnic Linguistic -0.0635 -0.0356*-0.0826**-0.0438+ -0.0546* -0.0183
Fragmentation (-3.87)** (-2.12) (-3.33) (-1.94) (-2.19) (-0.66)
Dummy -0.0187 -0.0649** -0.0589*
Sumatra (-1.18) (-3.04) (-2.24)
Dummy -0.0689** -0.1072** -0.0865**
Kalimantan (-3.76) (-4.41) (-2.92)
Dummy -0.0009 0.0147 -0.0468+
Sulawesi (-0.05) (0.65) (-1.69)
Dummy Nusa -0.0534** -0.0169 -0.0485+
Tenggara & Maluku (-3.27) (-0.78) (-1.86)
Dummy -0.0964* -0.3749** -0.0226
Papua (-2.05) (-5.93) (-0.29)
Constant 0.7656 0.9151 0.5043 0.6627 0.5150 0.6198
(4.55) (5.40) (3.11) (4.12) (3.00) (4.27)
Obs. 93 93 93 93 93 93
Note: z statistic in parentheses, + significant at 10%, *significant at 5%,**significant at 1%
The results in Tables 5 and 6 show evidence of yardstick competition.
The popularity for the incumbent as proxied by satisfaction with servi-
ces depends positively on neighboring districts’ satisfaction in the cases
of education and administrative services. In the case of taxes, for seve-
36
ral of the services, but specially education services, the incumbent’s popu-
larity decreases with the district’s tax rate but it increases with the tax
rates in neighboring districts. The latter results reproduce quite well some
of the yardstick competition results found in the literature for the Uni-
ted States and Europe. The results for the neighboring districts’ satis-
faction indicate increased popularity of the incumbent in a district with
increased satisfaction in neighboring districts. This sign is the reverse
of what we had expected to in terms of yardstick competition; at this
time we do not have an intuitive explanation for the result. The coeffi-
cient for Ethnic Linguistic Fragmentation takes a negative sign in all the
equations and it is often statistically significant. The results for the
regional dummy variables indicate as before that satisfaction with local
services in the other major islands of the country are relatively lower than
in Java, which is the richer and more developed island.
Testing for Tax Competition
Here we use the proxies for tax rates already explained above: own sour-
ce revenue as percentage of GRDP; own source revenue per capita; and
own source revenue as percentage of total revenues. The results presented
in Table 7 correspond to the last measure, “own source revenue as per-
centage of total revenues.” We should point out that, as discussed in Reve-
lli (2006), “tax competition” and “yardstick competition” theories yield
the same reduced form estimating equation. If one wants to differen-
tiate between them, we need to test for additional predictions of the the-
ory in the form of an auxiliary estimating equation (like the popularity
of the incumbent in the case of yardstick competition or changes in tax
bases as in the case of tax competition). Since we actually estimate
yardstick competition through the “incumbent vote” as just discussed
above we will proceed to test for the presence of tax competition.14
We estimate a model with the following specification: 
[6]
where Yi is defined as district i tax rates and yj district j tax rates (both
proxied by own revenues as a percentage of total revenues). Table 7 presents
results for this model. The coefficient for the spatially lagged variable is 
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14 However, without data on tax base changes we cannot entirely separate the results
for those for yardstick competition.
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Table 7. Tax competition 
Dependent variable: Migration weight matrix Distance 
Own tax rate weight matrix
Neighbor’s tax rates (Neighbor’s 0.2890* -0.0220 0.1279
own source rev./ total revenues) (2.27) (-0.15) (0.88)
Population density 1.37e-4** 9.27e-06 1.259e-4**
(8.65) (6.19)** (7.73)
Log transfers per capita -0.3162** -0.0059 -0.2049*
(-4.71) (-0.82) (-2.47)
Log GDRP per capita 2.68e-9+ 1.92e-15** 1.88e-9
(1.67) (4.83) (1.15)
Isolated island 0.1245 -0.0014 0.1268
(1.01) (-0.11) (1.01)
Landlocked -0.0489 -0.0003 -0.0536
(-0.72) (-0.05) (-0.74)
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.0863 0.0112 0.0178
(-0.84) (0.97) (0.16)
Dummy Sumatra -0.0678** -0.3039**
(-3.88) (-2.79)
Dummy Kalimantan -0.0634** -0.1759
(-3.19) (-1.29)
Dummy Sulawesi -0.0599** -0.2709*
(-3.23) (-2.19)
Dummy Nusa Tenggara & Maluku -0.0615** -0.2570+
(-3.19) (-1.94)
Dummy Papua -0.0855** -0.4279+
(-2.79) (-1.77)
Constant 1.2109 0.2004 -0.2429
(1.67) (1.05) (-0.26)
Obs. 275 275 275
Note: z statistic in parentheses, + significant at 10%, *significant at 5%,**significant at 1%
positive and statistically significant for the migration weight models wit-
hout regional dummies. This means that there would appear to be some
form of tax mimicking. When the regional dummies are included in the
regression the coefficient for the spatially lagged variable becomes nega-
tive and insignificant, indicating that tax interactions, competition or
mimicking, may not exist. Given the very limited scope for tax rate
38
competition in Indonesia because of the limited tax decentralization and
the small share of own source revenues in total revenues, this result is
somewhat expected. It is interesting to note, however, that the heavier
use of own revenues, of the higher local tax effort as limited as it may
be, is a determinant for the popularity of the incumbent as discussed
above for our estimations for yardstick competition. 
VI. Conclusion
There exist now vast literatures about jurisdictional competition span-
ning over several decades. The advent of spatial econometrics has enri-
ched this literature with new estimation methods to analyze the exis-
tence and various forms of fiscal competition. Although there has been
a lot of study on jurisdictional competition in North America and some
European countries, there has been much less research on its presence
and effects in the developing world. 
The main question addressed in this paper is how effective are models
of jurisdiction competition to explain local government accountability
in the context of decentralized developing countries. This question has
received little attention in the past literature. This paper contributes to
filling the gap in the literature by examining whether jurisdictional
competition has been present in Indonesia, a country that was strongly
decentralized in 2001. In particular, we research for the presence and
significance in post–decentralization Indonesia of three different forms
of fiscal competition that have been examined in the previous literatu-
re for developed countries: expenditure externalities, tax competition,
and yardstick competition. 
What we find is that, despite institutional and data constraints, we
can detect some forms of local government fiscal competition in Indo-
nesia after the Big Bang decentralization reform. Although we cannot
detect the presence of tax competition, we do find evidence of yardstick
competition and expenditure spillover effects. The results for yardstick
competition are, we believe, of particular significance since they suggest
that accountability mechanisms in decentralized developing countries
may be reinforced through the presence of inter-jurisdiction competi-
tion in terms of local government performance. 
This paper makes several contributions to the local fiscal competi-
tion literature. First, the paper provides the first systematic study of the
presence of and relevance of fiscal competition models to decentralized
developing countries. Second, the paper suggests a way to use survey data
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on the quality of public resources to test for the presence of yardstick
competition. Future research for other developing countries will be nee-
ded to confirm the relevance of fiscal competition processes in develo-
ping countries. 
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